to be at stake if the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement do not lead to an agreement.
They have failed a number of times before and life went on for Cypriots who continued to socially and economically prosper. This increasingly leads to international fatigue and loss of interest about the Cyprus problem. It also leads to a disturbing conservative tendency among Cypriot politicians and people who pronounce the benefits of a settlement, but in reality feel easier with 'the devil they know' and consequently seem to handle better potential failure in negotiations than the 'risk' of success.
Conventional discussions on the Cyprus conflict concentrate on the standard and changing positions of the two sides, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the complex mediating efforts of the UN and EU, and the constructive or destructive role of the 'motherlands', the 'internationals', civil society, the media, high profile lawsuits, etc. What has been less examined so far is the extent to which the inability of settling the Cyprus problem for over 40 years epitomizes a more subtle (yet complex) problem, which we seek to examine in this paper.
Simply put, the problem as we understand it revolves around the question of how much comfort to sacrifice or risk in exchange for what kind of peace. In other words, there exists, firstly a genuine, though also politically exploited, difficulty in determining how far the desired and long awaited 'peace settlement' in Cyprus can deliver anything very different in terms of rights and social development currently in place, that is, given the discussions on bi-zonality, guarantor powers, derogations and possible new exceptions. This is combined, secondly, with a suspicion-which can easily be securitized by either side-that a settlement may actually endanger the comfortable (il)liberal peace currently in place. We argue that in terms of everyday practice, the former breeds tension, contradictory discourses and unpredictable shifts in policy that complicate the settlement of the problem. The latter, we suggest, also breeds reaction and resistance to peacemaking interventions and 'foreign' plans. Note that this resistance may be justified or unjustified depending on one's perspective and although judgment over this matter is politically important its detailed analysis falls beyond the scope of this article. Also beyond the scope of this article is an examination of the full tenets of liberalism and the liberal peace model.
The Conflict and its Historical Background
The conflict in Cyprus is a protracted one, stemming at least from the 1950s. There are different understandings over what constitutes the 'Cyprus problem', what caused it and what would count as a 'final settlement' to it. In the abundant literature on the subject, the problem is viewed as an identity or ethno-national conflict, ii as a conflict based on the incompatibility of subject positions,
iii as the outcome of regional and superpower interests and interferences, iv or as a combination of any of the above. The 'double minority' environment v is also considered to be of particular importance not least because it makes Cyprus vulnerable to external influences, vi but also because it creates and sustains a threatening and securitized environment for both communities. Overall, and as Loizos argues, the Cyprus Problem should not be viewed as a single problem, but rather a multiple sets of problems produced by the policies of multiple actors and defined and interpreted in different ways at different times. On the one hand, it should be realized that liberalism as applied in divided Cyprus is combined with large doses of legal exceptionalism both north and south of the Buffer Zone. While there is broad agreement among Greek Cypriots that for 'true' peace to exist there needs to be a withdrawal of Turkish troops and the abandonment or revision of the Treaty of Guarantee, there is significant divergence in the public view on political and societal issues. Such issues include the governance structure, the number of settlers remaining following settlement and the 'strictness' or 'looseness' of bi-zonality. There are also disagreements on whether more or less integration of the two communities would lead to more or less peace than the status quo offers.
Perhaps the most important question of the Cypriot peace-liberty nexus is whether the status quo is better or worse than a proposed solution to the problem. The fact that the status quo offers Cypriots a form of (il)liberal peace creates a dilemma for both communities. Put differently, the status quo becomes a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), i.e.
preferable if the 'ideal solution' for each side cannot be agreed upon by the other. As a result, and depending on one's view on what will enhance or endanger 'peace', some perceive the international peace settlement interventions to be peace-promoting, while others perceive them as peace-suppressing.
Forms of Liberal Intervention
There are essentially four main actors involved in the peacebuilding operations in Cyprus: the United Nations, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Out of the four, the US intervenes the least. xviii The latter's direct peacebuilding interventions are limited to funding bi-communal programs (mainly through UNDP) that promote cooperation, sustainable development, social cohesion and research. The UK on the other hand has had a more active role, not least because of its colonial past and its status as one of the three guarantor powers. But its peacebuilding interventions are in the last decade or so increasingly channeled through the EU. The UN has always been the primary actor in all peacebuilding interventions in Cyprus.
Indeed, the bi-communal negotiations are always under the auspices of the UN. Lastly, the EU's direct and indirect interventions intensified as the relations between the EU on one hand and Cyprus and Turkey on the other, deepened.
Unlike other cases, all interventions that took place in the post-cold war period in Cyprus did not aim to prevent violence (as there was none), or to promote stability through democracy and liberal market economies. Instead they aimed at developing an environment (in Cyprus and abroad) where a resolution to the conflict could be facilitated and become more possible.
However, what they achieved, perhaps inadvertently, was to solidify the illiberal form of peace that exists in Cyprus by supporting a number of issues that the 'interveners' consider too difficult to negotiate. Issues such as the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee or the need for a guarantor power (e.g. to ensure the implementation of a solution), or certain aspects for the displacement and property issues (that not all displaced will be allowed to return and/or not necessarily regain all their property) are just indicative examples of illiberal features that are part of liberal peacebuilding interventions. Since 1974 the international actors have been using all of the abovementioned forms of intervention, usually at the same time. But their effectiveness depends primarily on the locals' responsiveness to the interventions (i.e. success or failure does not depend solely on the 'interveners' actions) meaning that unavoidably there will also be resistance.
As we argue below the degree of potential or actual resistance is subject to a number of variables including the comfort level of the conflict, the illiberal state of peace and the profoundness of the daily political and social routines that may lead, perhaps inadvertently, to the perpetuation of the conflict. Furthermore, the locals do not just resist the (direct or indirect)
interventions, but also use them in a way that they have a 'boomerang effect' on the conflict.
More specifically, the elite could and do incorporate direct interventions (i.e. compulsory impact) into their daily political routines and power struggle games to 'hurt' their political opponents. Resistance in this case is manifested through fear of political cost. In the case of the enabling impact (i.e. use of reference points), things are even direr, as there is no guarantee that this pathway will only be used in a positive way (i.e. to desecuritize the environment). Indeed, it could also be used in a negative way as some reference points enable elites to use the EU and other international organizations as 'weapons' to toughen their position and securitize further the already deeply securitized environment. Interventions that involve the public directly (i.e.
connective impact) have less chances of success in cases where the conflict is deeply internalized and the historic animosities are still vivid in the people's social memory. Resistance in these cases could be against the funding organizations, but also against the locals who participate in such activities. Said otherwise, resistance efforts are not always aimed towards the 'intervener' but also towards the 'recipient' who may be branded as a collaborator of foreign powers deviously trying to change local perceptions and impose unacceptable 'foreign' plans. to take place there must be a change in the underlying identities of the parties, and for such transformation to take place and have an effect, any new altered identity (e.g. a cosmopolitan, or
European or a common Cypriot one) must be able to out-compete the existing national identities. xxvii Whether such externally induced identities could be successful in conflict or post-conflict environments is, however, debatable. Indeed, any threat to the existing identities could bring forward more reaction and resistance that support the conflict-perpetuating routines, which, as mentioned below, maintain the populations' ontological security, but also the conflict.
Routine, Reaction and Resistance
As outlined above, what sets the environment for resistance to various international interventions in Cyprus is the lack of violence and the comfortable conflict or state of cold peace. This peace, though illiberal, is experienced as liberal by those who benefit from it, or are not adversely affected by the legal exceptionalism established north or south of, or in, the UN Buffer Zone.
Given the high degree of comfort in the status quo, there are reactions or resistance to any potential intervention (direct or indirect) that could jeopardize it. It is worth noting that the comfort and security is not only measured in economic terms, but also in societal, as the current status quo safeguards the way of living as well as the continuation of the identities of the two communities. This sense of ontological security xxviii is perpetuated through highly internalized social and political routines.
Such routines reduce anxiety and create a sense of security, but they are not necessarily contributing towards conflict resolution. xxix Indeed they could actually perpetuate the conflict.
Critical IR scholars explain that in the process of identity formation there is a need for the existence of the enemy 'other' in order to define who 'we' are. xxx Thus, certain conflictperpetuating routines may be maintained despite the fact that they hinder conflict resolution (or a peace settlement), precisely because they provide security for the 'self', that is, ontological security. xxxi As a result, the public and the elite consciously or unconsciously tend to resist any interventions that would disrupt these routines. This is especially the case if the conflict is not hurtful enough for the opposing sides, and in Cyprus the stalemate is not, which makes the perpetuation of such routines both possible and likely. Moreover, because in Cyprus these routines are deeply imbedded in the society, they include, inter alia, the way the conflict is talked about and commemorated, the perceptions of what constitutes a (societal, economic and political) threat for 'our' community, the way the problem should be negotiated, what the settlement must or must not entail, and so on and so forth.
While reaction and resistance may 'spike' in frequency and intensity during periods of significant international interventions (e.g. during the Annan Plan period), most of the local reactions and resistance acts are continuous and are part of the daily routines. Since any Cyprus problem developments constantly occupy a top spot in the local media, the political elite has the opportunity (often framed as a duty) to deal with the issue and show their commitment to specific positions on a daily basis. Regardless of who is in power, the ruling party(ies) need to constantly present their positions on how their efforts have an effect on any positive development or how they have dealt as efficiently and correctly as possible with any negative developments.
From this perspective any peacebuilding interventions could qualify as either positive or negative developments, and as such will occupy a top spot on the elite's agenda. Similarly, the domestic opposition needs to securitize, or, in other words, argue how the government's handling of the problem has been insufficient or even catastrophic. As a result, the political elites engage in daily power game routines and discourses, which charge and mobilize the population sometimes in support but more often in the resistance of peacebuilding interventions.
What is worth noting is that it is often not clear whether a development/intervention is positive or negative as each political party has different interpretations. This means that even an 'obviously' positive development (for the international agents) could be turned into (or be Despite their disagreements, the ruling local elites on both sides of the Buffer Zone cannot easily and openly oppose or criticize the intentions of the international peacebuilding interventions, as such acts are judged to be politically costly for their community. Consequently, they are always particularly careful with the phrasing of any potential disagreements with the international players. Similarly, they are also very careful to what degree they accept and adopt each intervention, as that could also have political cost domestically; albeit in such cases it is the individual elite or the political party that will incur the cost and not the entire community.
Political parties in Cyprus have a significant impact on the public's perceptions about political developments, including the international interventions, which means that the elite-level resistance spills over to the society relatively easily. Cypriots are relatively loyal to their parties, due to patronage, and often like to exhibit their strong views about political issues. Having said that, and even though the parties' opinions certainly matter, bottom-level resistance could also be more direct, bypassing and many times preceding the official positions. This is especially true for cases where the public view -formed and informed by the local mass media -a priori perceives the international actors to be biased.
This kind of public reaction or a priori resistance, even if not voiced explicitly, is at the center of the international intervention problematic in Cyprus because it is a major obstacle for both the international 'interveners' and for any local elite that would like to cooperate with them.
For example, the Greek Cypriot public/mass media will almost immediately criticize any British proposed initiative (given the colonial experience) or a proposal by specific individuals such as the UN special envoy, Alexander Downer. The Turkish-Cypriot public/mass media, on the other hand tend to see the EU as being biased, not least because both the RoC and Greece are members, while Turkey is not. To that extent, provisions that underscore the European acqui communitaire tend to be viewed negatively if they do not entail permanent or temporary derogations that take into account the Cypriot acqui, i.e. the post-1974 'realities', including the effective implementation of the principle of bizonality.
xxxv Interestingly there are no serious attempts by the Greek-and Turkish-Cypriot elites to eliminate or mitigate these deeply internalized perceptions about foreign (peacebuilding) interventions since, as mentioned above, such attempts could be perceived as being tantamount to a political suicide. Most international efforts are therefore held hostage to the internalized negative perceptions about specific actors and to the inability of the elite to break the routines that sustain these perceptions. Indeed it is more likely for the elite to sustain these routines as part of the local power games, but also because the society seems to accept or existentially 'need' the perpetuation of the conflict.
Not even the EU escapes this obstacle. Quite the opposite, it becomes part of the problem. Matters pertaining to the European intervention are increasingly becoming more complex. European valuesare progressively used to resist peacebuilding interventions either from the EU itself or from the UN. This has, in effect, the 'reverse' enabling impact, as the elite instead of using the EU to desecuritize the environment, they use it to securitize it further. Both sides include the EU in their conflict perpetuating routines, by using it as a rationale to argue why a specific intervention is not suitable or legitimate enough, making it thus even harder for any local or foreign actor to break them. Indicatively, Greek Cypriots tend to use the EU to argue against the strict bizonality and in favor of more freedom of movement and residence. Moreover, they use the EU acquis not only to become more 'inflexible' but also to reject certain unsatisfactory UN positions. We can call the accomplished peace Pax Turca and the aspired one Pax Europaea.
The Pax Turca has pacified Cyprus, forcefully and tragically, through the de facto division of the island and displacement of populations. It has enhanced or made possible the creation of democratic yet ethnocratic polities: one internationally recognized and in principle, but not in practice, bi-communal; the other internationally unrecognized and in both principle and practice mono-communal. Both polities work and legitimate themselves on the basis of western liberal norms and values, yet both polities apply versions of legal exceptionalism to deny the rights of the 'other' community (though, clearly, the exceptionalism in the north is harder than in the south). To that extent, there is a liberal peace that works for some but not for others;
specifically it does not work for those who experience the illiberal side of ethnocentrism and the 'doctrine of necessity'.
The Pax Europaea continues to be a distant liberal aspiration though the accession of the RoC into the EU has brought it closer and has intensified calls (especially among the Greek Cypriots) that the European acquis should work to make the illiberal peace more liberal. This follows on an idealization of the EU and its liberal values that may not hold up to scrutiny. For example, it is certain that whatever peace settlement is agreed upon, the Greek-Cypriot side will want to restrict not only the size of the Turkish settlers (which officially includes also people born in Cyprus) but also the right of residence of Turkish nationals in the island if Turkey joins the EU, i.e. an exception to the acquis. When it comes to the Turkish-Cypriot community, suspicions and discounts from the acquis are stronger: the Pax Europaea would be welcome only to the extent there are even more derogations and exceptions than for the south. In short, the aspired liberal peace of the EU comes for each side with an illiberal string and milder versions of exceptionalism (to what we have now in Cyprus). In any case and to a certain extent this exceptionalism is not something absent within territories of the EU. It is nonetheless a cause of distress to one Cypriot side when the other side's exception is being propagated as necessary or just and as a discount to the aspired liberal peace, something that in effect (deliberately or inadvertently) leads to the solidification of the Pax Turca.
It is also possible that the continued stalemate in negotiations and the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement to 'the problem' in the near future will lead to the progressive merging of the Pax Turca and the Pax Europaea. To an extent this has already happened in the way issues like direct flights to the north and direct trade with the Turkish-Cypriot community are being discussed within the EU institutions, in lieu of formal recognition of the TRNC, yet against the wishes and protestations of the RoC. It is still too early to fully visualize this new hybrid peace but if it comes about it will certainly renew claims, discussions and contestations as to the implications of its liberal/illiberal character. 
